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Abstract
This paper discusses some issues about the usage of SDL and related commercial
SDL support tools for the validation of a railway signalling system: in particular, the
issue of the multiple conﬁgurations presented by this system is addressed, discussing
the possible strategies to validate the system regardless to the actual conﬁguration.
1 Introduction
Formal methods have been recognized as a mean for preventing the introduc-
tion of software faults in a safety critical system. This is particularly true in
the ﬁeld of railway signalling systems, so that even CENELEC guidelines [4]
for software development recommend the use of formal methods. Several suc-
cess stories have been reported in this ﬁeld, starting from the early application
of B in the development of the control software for the Paris metro [6, 7].
Nowadays, the industrial trend is directed to the adoption of formal veriﬁca-
tion techniques to validate the design, integrating them within the existing
development process: industries seem more keen to accept formal veriﬁcation
techniques assessing the quality attributes of their products, obtained by a
traditional life cycle, rather than a fully formal life cycle development, due to
the lower training and innovation costs of the former.
The availability of commercial tools for the support of formal speciﬁcation
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and veriﬁcation has boosted in the recent years the use of those speciﬁc for-
malisms that the tools support. Two major examples in this direction are
SDL [1], a standard developed within the telecommunication industry, and
the Statecharts supported by the iLogix Statemate tool. We refer to [8] and
[5] for two notable examples of application of such formalisms to railway sig-
nalling systems.
In a collaboration with General Electric Transportation Systems we have con-
ducted a pilot project aimed at the evaluation of the introduction of the SDL
technology in their development cycle. The project, described in [3], has ad-
dressed the speciﬁcation in SDL of a railway signalling system, and its simula-
tion. In this paper we present some further discussion on the validation made
possible by some of the adopted SDL support tools, especially addressing the
issues raised by the multiple conﬁguration nature of the system at hand.
Indeed, we can describe the system as a distributed system, which is stat-
ically conﬁgured by means of a varying number of general components con-
nected under a given topology. Each component can be conﬁgured according
to the way they are connected each other, by means of suitable conﬁguration
parameters.
We have therefore planned a validation campaign made at two following
levels:
• validating the single units composing the system in all the possible conﬁg-
urations;
• validating typical conﬁgurations made by several units.
In this paper, we discuss the approach followed at the ﬁrst level, by eval-
uating the most suitable validation techniques for this purpose.
2 Description of the SCA system
The SCA system (Sistema Conta Assi, axel counter system), developed by
General Electric Transportation Systems, G.E.T.S., is a device which counts
the number of wheelsets belonging to trains which are travelling in a given
railway section. This operation is made using suitable sensors, which are
placed aside the track. The consecutive calculations of the number of wheelsets
entering and leaving the railway section allows to establish if the section itself
is free (if the number of leaving wheelsets is equal to the number of entering
wheelsets) or is still occupied by a train. This information is used to enable or
to forbid the next train to enter the section, by means of a suitable (external)
semaphore signalling.
The SCA system is composed by several Control and Acquisition Units,
named UCAs, placed along the tracks, and by Detection Points placed aside
the track, named PRAs. The UCA-PRA connection is shown in Figure 1.
A PRA is formed by two wheel detectors named DRTs, located each at one
of the rails, for redundancy. The two detectors must give the same signal
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Fig. 1. UCA-PRA connection.
consecutively. If only one of them sends the signal of a passing wheel, the
UCA goes in a ”fail-safe” state, in which a suitable automatic block relay,
connected to the external signalling system, is disabled. A typical eﬀect is to
set all signals to red.
UCA units are located at the beginning of a section; they receive and pro-
cess the signals modulated by the DRTs, in order to determine the number of
axels running on the track; these data are sent to remote UCAs via modem.
Using remote data, the UCA can determine whether the section is still occu-
pied or not, and in the ﬁrst case it stops a following train by disabling the
automatic block relay. Since a track can be generally run in two directions,
UCAs are able to check both the trains entering the railway section and the
leaving ones.
2.1 UCA functions and the configurations of SCA system
The SCA type depends on the number of UCAs constituting the system, and
on the conﬁguration data of UCAs themselves. Among these we mention the
most important conﬁguration parameters:
(i) UCA role in a modem communication (master, slave);
(ii) Number of checked railway sections;
(iii) Number of connected PRAs;
(iv) Type of the SCA system (single-section, multiple-section);
The main UCA functionalities are the following:
• Core function and Input/Output management. This is the core axel count-
ing functionality, but extends to read all the input signals (from DRTs or
from other UCAs), handled by means of proper ﬁlters, and to produce ac-
cording output, e.g the enabling/disabling of the automatic block relay.
• Error management. This functionality analyzes all the errors occurred in
the system units. If a vital error occurs, the section is declared busy,
disabling the automatic block relay. All the error data are saved in a
NOVRAM, together with the time and date of occurrence. In this way,
error data can be downloaded from a diagnostic PC.
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• Diagnostics. This function allows a runtime hardware check to be per-
formed. It is possibile to get the diagnostic results, error and conﬁguration
data by connecting a PC to the UCA RS232 serial port.
2.1.1 Single-section SCA
A single-section SCA can check only one railway section (Figure 2). It is
formed by two UCAs, which are linked via a modem connection, each of them
placed at one end of the section; they receive signals coming from PRAs, which
can be in a number from 2 to 4.
Fig. 2. Single-section SCA.
2.1.2 Multiple-section SCA
A SCA system in multiple-section conﬁguration (Figure 3) can check up to
6 railway sections at the same time: in addition to the header UCA, located
at each end of the section, there are one or more intermediate UCAs. Every
UCA communicates by means of two diﬀerent modem channels. Moreover, up
to 4 PRAs can be linked to each UCA.
Fig. 3. Multiple-section SCA.
3 Validation strategies and tools
Within the pilot project conducted with General Electric Transportation Sys-
tems, a SDL speciﬁcation of the SCA system was developed using the Cin-
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derella SDL tool, exploiting the simulation capabilities of the tool to perform
an initial veriﬁcation of its conformance to the system requirements.
We delay to section 4 some details on the SDL SCA speciﬁcation, since we
want ﬁrst to introduce the veriﬁcation activities that we are going to exploit,
recalling that the aim of this work is however limited to the analysis of what
can be achieved in this direction by commercial SDL support tools.
Validating a system is often conceived as providing the evidence that all pos-
sible behaviours of the system have been veriﬁed not to produce problems, in
reference to the requirement documents. The coverage concept is widely used
in the area of software testing, at this regard, to measure the percentage of
the system which has been exercised by the performed tests: particular struc-
tures of a program are chosen as the unit of coverage, so that the notion of
statement coverage, branch coverage, condition coverage, etc... are commonly
used.
In the case of a SDL speciﬁcation, a symbol coverage concept is used: a 100%
symbol coverage is achieved by a validation eﬀort if all the graphic elements
appearing in the SDL descriptions of the system state machines (that is, in the
SDL processes) have been exercised. This assures that all the states deﬁned
in the SDL processes have been properly validated, but it may be that not all
the possible values of the process variables have been considered: in fact, if we
consider the system as composed by extended-ﬁnite state machines (EFSMs),
two system states are diﬀerent not only because of diﬀerent states of a process,
but also because of diﬀerent values assigned to the process variables, even if
in presence of the same process state. Symbol coverage hence abstracts from
values of variables.
Fig. 4. DRT Buﬀer reading and writing.
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A ﬁrst approach to validate a SDL speciﬁcation is by simulation. During
the simulation activity, the system is handled as a black-box, which, following
suitable input stimuli, must send the expected output signals to the system
environment. Simulation is essentially a testing performed at the speciﬁcation
level. Several SDL tools, like Cinderella or Telelogic TAU SDT provide support
for simulation. If any undesired behavior is revealed, a possible ﬂaw in the
system design can be located searching the parts of the model which processed
the input signals. Such processing can be analyzed in detail using the Message
Sequence Chart formalism [2], as shown in Figure 4, taken from [3], where this
MSC is used to describe an anomaly detected during the simulation of the SDL
model of SCA.
Unfortunately, simulation can verify only one path in the system state
space at a time, and hence a very partial coverage of the model can be ob-
tained. An alternative technique supported by Telelogic TAU SDT is called in
SDT terminology “validation” and consists in exploring the state space gener-
ated by the processes of the system by executing a suitable algorithm: either
exhaustive search until reaching a speciﬁed depth, or partial search following
several criteria in the choice of the next state to be explored. Contrary to sim-
ulation, the validator itself manages the signals from the environment which
are to be sent to the system, in order to ﬁnd possible undesired behaviours of
the model. The SDT Validator provides a list of situations that may imply an
undesired behaviour (such as deadlock, implicit signal consumptions, etc. . . )
that can be checked by the Validator itself. Moreover, MSCs can be used
to explicitely deﬁne undesired (or desired) behaviours. The notion of symbol
coverage is usefully applied also at validation, because real SDL systems often
have a very large state space, and hence one is interested to know whether the
validation has covered interesting aspects of the system.
4 Modeling UCA multiple-configuration with SDL
4.1 Modeling multiple configurations with SDL
A common approach to modeling a system composed by a variable number of
components, number which depends on conﬁguration parameters, is to deﬁne
some notion of type of components, and to declare as many instances of this
type as are needed in the desired conﬁguration. This approach is especially
common in object-oriented design.
In SDL, it is possible to deﬁne process types, and to dynamically create
new instances of a process type whenever they are needed. Therefore, in the
model of the SCA system we are going to present, each UCA has a number
of instances for each component process, depending on the conﬁguration pa-
rameters. The technique used to model such a system is to take advantage
of the SDL semantics in generating the desired conﬁguration: a Conﬁgura-
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Fig. 5. SCA SDL Formal Speciﬁcation.
tion block is deﬁned with the aim of handling the parameters describing the
conﬁguration: then, the needed instances for each process can be generated
by means of a SDL create operation. So, when starting a simulation, a ﬁrst
step of system instantiation occurs, then the model can be veriﬁed by send-
ing suitable stimuli, and using only one SDL model: to switch between more
conﬁgurations, it suﬃces to change the conﬁguration parameters.
4.2 Modeling the SCA System with SDL
We give now some details about the SDL speciﬁcation of the SCA system,
reported in Figure 5. We can recognize the Conﬁguration block that stores
the conﬁguration parameters, and generates at the system startup the number
of instances of PRA and diagnostic processes, connected to the block UCA,
that are allocated to simulate the desired system conﬁguration. The conﬁg-
uration parameters also identify the role of the UCA block during modem
communication (master, slave), depending on the type of the SCA system to
be simulated (single-section, multiple-section): for example, if the UCA block
represents an intermediate UCA in a multiple-section conﬁguration, the two
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blocks REMOTE1 and REMOTE2 simulate the remote UCAs which the UCA
block is connected to. Diagnostic communications are speciﬁed by means of
the PC block, that simulates the external RS232-connected PC.
Fig. 6. Substructure UCA in SCA system.
From what we have said, it appears that in Figure 5 are represented not
only the UCA(s), but also the other blocks costituting the system, therefore
a SDL speciﬁcation of their behaviour is needed, even though they are not all
actually implemented by software components. Their deﬁnition is needed to
simulate the environment in which the UCA, which is the software component
of interest, is going to live.
The most interesting unit of this SDL system is therefore the UCA, for which
we show the internal structure in Figure 6. The MANAGE DRT and MAN-
AGE INOUT blocks handle the signals coming from DRTs and the generation
of errors, if the input signals are not the expected ones. The DIAGNOSTICS
block concerns the diagnostic requests from the external PC. Communica-
tions to remote UCAs are modeled by the two instances MODEMSLOT1 and
MODEMSLOT2 of the MODEM block type, which implements the diagnos-
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tic communication protocol. Accordingly to safety requirements, system tests
are performed by a main loop inside the block LOOP MAIN. Moreover, the
LOOP MAIN block schedules all the processes.
4.3 Validating multiple configurations
Since with the given speciﬁcation all possible conﬁgurations are modeled
within the system structure, in principle “validation” (in SDT terms) is po-
tentially able to address the system under all its possible conﬁgurations, by
exhaustively exploring the reachable state space under any possible conﬁgu-
ration option.
In a model formalized with the previous technique, however, the problem of
the state space explosion arises, due to dynamic creation of process instances,
even if the ranges of the conﬁguration parameters are given some ﬁnite (and
in our case, small) bound.
Moreover, we have already said that the exhaustive search nature of validation,
aiming at a high symbol coverage, is related to the state space contributed by
the processes deﬁned in the SDL speciﬁcation, and not to the contribution to
the state space given by variables. This means that even validation does not
explore all possibilities in terms of variables values. This has the eﬀect, in our
case, since the choice of diﬀerent conﬁgurations is made early in the system
behaviour on the basis of conﬁguration parameters (stored in variables), that
some large sections of the model may result uncovered. Actually, some valida-
tion tests using Telelogic TAU SDT Validator resulted in a symbol coverage
of the model of 37%.
4.4 UCA Incremental Validation using MSCs
To aim for a higher symbol coverage, the idea is to explicitly validate one
conﬁguration at a time, by sending from the environment the conﬁguration
parameters when running each validation test. Of course, we need to come
back to the starting state after each validation is ﬁnished: this is possible if we
use SDT Navigator to walk back into the state space until the starting state
is found: then, the next validation with another conﬁguration can be run. In
this way, the symbol coverage of the model is automatically incremented after
each validation.
Moreover, in SCA modem and diagnostic protocols, particular message se-
quences are expected for the transmission of error data to the external PC
and to communicate to the remote UCAs the passing of a train through the
checked railway section. Since the validator randomly generates the signal
sequences sent from the environment to the system, for a large model like
SCA the expected sequences are unlikely to be sent. As a result, the model
sections in which the correct signal sequences are managed are diﬃcult to
cover, and the validation process is quite slow. To improve state space re-
duction, coverage and speed of the validation process, MSCs representing the
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correct sequences of protocol messages are to be used in order to pilot valida-
tion tests. In this way, only the messages in the MSC are taken into account
by the Validator, thus reducing the state space to be explored. Obviously,
this amounts to validate the UCA in presence of a correct environment. It
is also important, however, to verify the resilience of UCA in presence of an
incorrect behaviour of its environment. Undesired behaviours can be repre-
sented with other suitable MSCs. Given assumptions on the occurrence of
faults in the environment may be taken into account in the deﬁnition of such
incorrect behaviours: a typical example are single-failure assumptions. If the
system behaves correctly in presence of input sequences according to such as-
sumptions, we can positively conclude on its fault-tolerant design. Using MSC
driven validation, we have soon reached a symbol coverage of 52%. Furtherly,
reﬁning the validation strategy, we can easily reach higher levels of coverage.
5 Conclusions
We have discussed an experience in the validation of a system speciﬁed in
SDL by means of commercial support tools, namely the Telelogic TAU SDT
Validator and Simulator. In particular we have concentrated on the multiple
conﬁguration nature of the system, showing how the tools should be used to
best address this issue.
This work has been done as part of a wider eﬀort to evaluate the feasibility of
the use of such tools in the development cycle of an industrial product. Next
work will address two issues:
• the validation of the whole SCA system, under diﬀerent conﬁgurations
• the automatic generation of code from the SDL speciﬁcation, and its eval-
uation in terms of time and space characteristics.
For what concern the ﬁrst issue, we recall that the current SCA model is
constituted by a single UCA which is conﬁgured according to the conﬁgura-
tion parameters; remote connected UCAs are simulated by REMOTE1 and
REMOTE2 blocks, in the environment of the UCA block.
It is therefore possible to substitute such blocks with copies of the UCA itself,
and to perform a validation of the whole system. Obviously, the state space
will increase and the coverage will decrease accordingly. It is also interesting
to notice that Telelogic SDT allows to perform a distributed simulation and/or
validation by connecting many SDL models, each of them can be veriﬁed on a
single computer. Hence a complete distributed veriﬁcation of the SCA system
can be performed by running each constituting UCA model, properly conﬁg-
ured, on a diﬀerent PC.
For what concerns the automatic generation of code from the SDL model,
SDT Cmicro is one of the C code generators provided with Telelogic Tau
SDT: its main feature lies in the optimized generation of code for embed-
ded systems. Unfortunately, some SDL restrictions occur when using this
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code generator: for example, process instances cannot be created by passing
parameters with the FPARS SDL statement in the process header, and the
multiple-conﬁguration technique used to model the system utilizes exactly this
method to create process instances depending on the conﬁguration parame-
ters.
We should therefore resort to include statically all instances of processes in
the speciﬁcation, regardless of the conﬁguration. The result is a less elegant
SDL model, which is counterbalanced by the beneﬁts, in terms of time spent
in code developing, which can be obtained by automatically generating the
code.
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